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Abstract : The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange in economic 
activities. The predominance in agriculture of informal contracts leads in many countries to 
the implementation of specific legal rules for contract law. This article emphasises the 
complementarities between public and private ordering when contracts are informal. We 
analyse the role of private contract-enforcement institution (CEI) as a support for multilateral 
reputation mechanisms. Our case study is focusing on interprofessional organisations, which 
are usually analysed as cartels having a negative impact on welfare. We demonstrate that 
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Introduction  
The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange in economic 
activities. Many legal institutions are today supporting contractual commitment (Schwarz, 
2003, 2004, Hadfield, 2005). And as a matter of fact, the role of legal systems as a framework 
for market exchange is receiving more attention by academic scholars (Rubin 2005). A large 
part of the economic literature on contract enforcement focused on the role of judge and the 
design of judicial institutions, including public court, and more recently alternative private 
arbitration of adjudicatory systems. In this perspective, the challenge was for the economists 
to develop a theory of the optimal judiciary scope of intervention and the class of problem 
over which the court has discretion (Tirole, 1992). More recently, Schwartz (1999, 2003) 
suggests adopting a broader perspective on contract law and its implementation by focusing 
on contract regulation, meaning what terms the state should supply to firms to use in 
transactions. An economic theory of contract regulation will have a substantive and an 
institutional aspect. The substantive aspect asks what the state should do. The institutional 
aspect asks which legal institutions should perform the needed regulatory tasks.  
Another trend in research emphasises the role of private micro-institutions in contract 
enforcement for the development of market exchanges (Milgrom, North, Weingast, 1990, 
Clay, 1997, Greif, 1993, 2005). These studies mostly focus on historical and geographical 
situation where the absence of formal law or state enforcement leads economic agents to 
develop other private mechanisms of guarantees as a support for contract enforcement. More 
recently a distinction was introduced between spontaneous organic institutions and 
intentionally designed private institutions2. In a recent article, Greif (2005) was suggesting 
that we do not have a systematic body of knowledge regarding either their relative efficiency 
of public order and designed-private order institutions or the factors influencing their relative 
efficiency (p. 142).  
The aim of this paper is to connect these two trends of literature and to bring some 
coherence to the private ordering literature and fill the theoretical blind spot created by the 
literature’s legal centric perspective. Some recent trend in the literature on private ordering 
compares the efficiencies of private (extra-legal) contract enforcement with the more 
traditional use of public law and state-run courts (Richman, 2005). Based on a comparison of 
the respective administrative costs of public and private systems (Berstein, 1992, 1996, 2001), 
                                                 
2 As the delineation of what are “private” and “public” institutions remains controversial in the literature, we 
refer here to the distinction proposed by Greif (2005) where public institution rely on public order and sanctions 
imposed by the state, while private institutions being defined and implemented by economic agents themselves.   
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these studies suggests that private enforcement mechanisms can be superior to the traditional, 
less efficient enforcement measures of courts, for the reason that they offer substantive costs 
savings. In their study, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) are focusing on the role of private 
ordering under dysfunctional public order. Going one step further, Richman (2005) argues 
that economic agents deliberately decline to rely on available court remedies to enforce 
agreements. In this perspective, public and private contract enforcement mechanisms are more 
substitute than complementary instruments available to economic agents to manage 
contractual relationships (Clay, 1997). Moreover, formal rules could undermine the operation 
of social norms supporting informal dealings by damaging reciprocity norms among 
participants.  
Another theoretical perspective is to consider them as complementary instruments 
(Klein, 1992, 1996, Lazzarini et al; 2004). The complementarity view suggests that the joint 
use of formal/public and informal/private arrangements provides more efficient outcomes 
than the use of either arrangement in isolation., the main assumption is here that contract law 
may also support private ordering mechanisms and reinforce their efficiency, both by 
preventing ex ante potential source of litigations and reducing ex post enforcement and 
litigation costs. We emphasise here possible complementarities between the existence of 
contract law and the implementation of reputation based mechanisms for private contract 
enforcement (Klein, 1992, 1996). In these models, these complementarities were first 
emphasised between contract law and bilateral contractual arrangements3. In a recent article, 
Greif (2005) suggests that more attention should be paid to quasi-private institutions or hybrid 
institutions combining private and public order.  
One good example of adopting a broader view on contract regulation is provided by 
the agricultural sector, where contract law included over time specific dimensions to improve 
the effectiveness of contract enforcement, especially in regards with the predominance of 
informal contracts for many agricultural productions and the specific role of collective 
organization of producers, like producer’s groups or interprofessional associations, or on the 
opposite, the development of formal “integration contracts” between small farmers and large 
agro-food industries for some dedicated productions like poultry or pig breeding. Contract 
regulation is taking various forms for which the support of law may play a crucial role to 
support these collective organization of producers. Nevertheless, some lawyers were 
                                                 
3 As suggested by Schwartz (2003) the function of law is to provide resources for contract regulation. In this 
perspective, other dimensions than the role of public court and judge’s decision need to be taken into account. 
According to the same author “contract regulation is [only] in its infancy”.  
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questioning the utility of such legal framework (Danet, 1982). Their argument was based on 
an implicit trade-off between the costs of designing and implementing this legal framework 
and their effective adoption and use by a large number of agricultural sectors. Another 
dimension of this trade-off was related to the level of generality to be included in the law and 
the need for such specialized legal framework. The question addressed in this article is then: 
why this heterogeneity among agricultural sectors in the adoption of this legal framework that 
appears at first sight to support stakeholder’s interests and the economic efficiency? What are 
the underlying mechanisms that can explain their ability to facilitate contract enforcement and 
prevent potential sources of litigations? What is the role of this specific legal framework law 
and its attractiveness in term of costs/benefits for both farmers and agro-food firms ?  
The idea that the effectiveness of contract law is central for the growth of economic 
activities is beginning to be widespread many areas (Hadfield, 2005). However, in the 
economic literature, these collective organizations in agriculture have been mostly analysed 
recently, as potential cartels and suspected of collusive behaviours and illegal agreements on 
the determination of market price or quantities to be produced. Competition law is prohibiting 
such behaviour due to their possible negative impact on consumer surplus and total welfare 
(Crespi, Sexton, 2004). Nevertheless, such behaviour may remain the exception, rather than 
the rule regarding the multiplicity of these types of organizations. Another interpretation is 
proposed by Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1975, Ménard, 1996).  
In this perspective, an appropriate design of contract law to support collective 
organization of producers may help to reduce transaction costs, especially through a reduction 
of ex ante contracting costs, including ex ante information search, bargaining and the writing 
of contracts, and ex post measurement and enforcement costs (Barzel, 1989). The court is 
intervening here only as an instance of last appeal. One striking thing about this type of 
private institutions, also noticed by Clay (1997), is that their role in contract regulation is 
sometimes difficult to observe due to the fact that their major role is on dispute prevention 
and improving the self-enforcing range of contracts (Klein, 1992) rather than intervening 
directly in ex post resolution of contract litigations, like in the case of private arbitration 
systems or public courts. Nevertheless, it is possible to demonstrate, based on an extension of 
the model of Klein (1992, 1996) to the implementation of multilateral reputation mechanism, 
that the collective organisation of farmers may operate as private Contract-Enforcement 
Institutions (CEI - Greif, 2005) by increasing the self-enforcing-range of contracts. The 
existence of a legal framework allows scale economies and a reduction of administrative costs 
linked to the implementation of these third party enforcement mechanisms.   
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Empirical data is based in a first step on a diachronic and historical analysis of the 
evolution and specific dimensions of contract law in agriculture, especially regarding the 
support of collective organization of producers (section I). In a second step, we will 
demonstrate that the shift from the bilateral paradigm to the multilateral reputation models 
requires a distinctly different application of the transaction cost model help to understand the 
role of contract law in improving the functioning of the collective organization of producers 
as contract enforcement mechanisms  (section II). Empirical evidence are then provided using 
the example of the cattle industry which decide to use this legal interprofesional framework 
compared to other agricultural sectors which do not (section III). A more general predictive 
model is then provided to explain the adoption or not of these legal frameworks (section IV). 
This paper formulates a positive model that predicts when parties will employ private 
ordering to enforce their agreements.  
I –  SPECIFIC DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT LAW IN AGRICULTURE  
Contract law in agriculture includes specificities into two main directions: i) the 
specific legal statute of integration contracts to be distinguished from the category of labor 
contracts involving a complete subordination of the employees;  ii) the recognition of a 
special statute to collective organisations in agriculture4. Both of these adjustments in contract 
law designed in the 60’s and 70’s were mainly motivated for the legislator towards the 
protection of small and scattered farmers facing a drastic market concentration and horizontal 
consolidation of agro-food industries (Danet, 1982).  
1.1 – The rule-of-law for contract regulation    
Such institutions are nowadays pervasive in agriculture where collective organization 
of producers has been extensively used in the past in order to organize the development of 
agricultural markets (Pirrong, 1995). The role of collective organisation, like cooperatives, 
marketing association, producer’s groups, marketing board, and so on has been widely 
recognized and promoted in agriculture since the beginning of the 20th century. First, build up 
to facilitate the development of food production and the organization of marketing channels, 
they play a central role in modern agriculture. As well, the rapid modernization of agriculture 
involves higher uncertainty regarding technology, and the introduction of contractual 
innovations defining new risk sharing rules among contractual parties (Ménard, 1996). 
                                                 
4 This legal framework includes in the case of the French context: Law n°60-808 of 05/08/1960 on contract-
types, Law of 8/08/1962 on collective organisation of producers and producer groups, Law n064-678 of 
6/07/1964 regulating integration contracts and defining campaign contracts, and more recently Law n°75-600 of 
10 july 1975 supporting the creation of interprofessional association in agriculture.  
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Facing these rapid changes and modernization processes, the legislator introduces in 
the early 60’s several legal improvement regarding contract regulation:   
- a better legal framing of integration contracts, used in situations where small farmers 
were completely dependant of the agro-food firms, both in term of technology used for animal 
buildings, the supply of feeding stuffs, medications in intensive farming systems… The main 
concerned agricultural sectors were indoor pig, veal and poultry productions. They aim to 
protect small farmers against possible abuse of power and “unfair” contractual agreements. 
- the possibility to use contract-type and campaign contracts which were negotiated 
between farmer’s unions and agro-food firms, especially regarding the prices to be applied 
and quality specifications, at the beginning of each production campaign and serve as a 
reference for the definition of all individual contracts5. These collective agreements were 
initiated first within production contracts for the production of processed vegetables. These 
agreements were guaranteeing an equality of treatment among all farmers, and as well a 
reduction of total negotiation costs for all individual contracts.   
The other part of the legislative innovation regarding contract law in agriculture relies 
on the importance of collective organisations as a support for contract regulation. These 
collective organisations are not restricted to cooperatives, but may also include other private 
producers associations, also called “producer’s groups, achieving technical and marketing 
support, and as well private interprofessionnal associations involving all representatives 
economic agents involved in a specific agricultural sector. The legal recognition and framing 
of producer’s group took place in the early 60’s, but we will have to wait fifteen years to have 
a dedicated legal framework to interprofessional agreements and associations in agriculture.  
1.2 – Balancing bargaining powers through collective organisations  
One of the problems met with the implementation of contract-types or campaign 
contracts is the absence of a formal administrative authority responsible for supporting ex 
ante negotiations and monitoring ex post the effective implementation of these agreements 
(Danet, 1982). One specific critical dimensions was the definition of quality standards and 
their measurement for the determination of the prices to be paid to farmers, as most of  
potential cheating and opportunistic behaviour either of farmers or agro-food firms were 
taking place at this step of the contracting process (see Chalfant, Sexton, 2004).  
                                                 
5 This approach to contract design is then contrasting with theoretical results of agency theory focusing on the 
optimization of individual incentives contracts. This means that the gains in term of  reduction of negotiation 
costs are larger than the loss of incentive intensity (Allen, Lueck, 2002).  
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It is only in 1975 that the legislator finally decides finally to introduce this dedicated 
legal framework to support interprofessional organization in agriculture. This law was 
grounded to the experience carried out in a specific agricultural sector, processed vegetable, 
where production contrats by which farmers commit to sell all their production at the end of 
the production campaign are dominant. But the law of 1964 did not include any specifications 
on rules of renegociation and control of the effective compliance to contract-types, and more 
over the funding of the organization in charge of these activities (UNILET). Each agricultural 
sector remains free whether to use or not this legal framework. It endows the beneficiary of 
special prerogatives and, by delegation, on part of the normative and coercive power of the 
state regarding contract regulation in their own agricultural sector. Three major benefits were 
expected from the implementation of this legal framework :  
First, the use of this legal framework is reinforcing its legitimacy as it is formalizing a 
process of agreements among all representative professional organizations of one specific 
sector, including farmer’s union, cooperatives, large and small retailers, middlemen, agro-
industries and manufacturers.  
Second, they benefits of special funding rules through compulsory tax contribution for 
all firms involved in one dedicated agricultural sector. The main advantage is here, as we will 
see later, to reduce the costs of collecting money. As well, it is covering the administrative 
costs of functioning for these interprofessional organization supervising the implementation 
of interprofessional agreements.  
Third, these interprofessional associations can define “interprofessionnal agreements”, 
which benefits of “a clause of extension » by law which mean that these agreements are 
compulsory for all the firms involved in this sector. Nevertheless, the enforcement of these 
“interprofessional agreements” remains under the sole responsibility of this interprofessional 
organization, and not by state services6.  
In return, beneficiaries have to comply with very restrictive conditions warranting the 
concerns of lawyers regarding its attractiveness to economic agents and its effective large 
implementation in many agricultural sectors (Danet, 1982). One of these limitations is linked 
to the possibility of creating only one interprofessional association for each specific 
agricultural production at the national (Danet, 1982). A central issue is then related to the 
delineation of the appropriate perimeter of what is a dedicated agricultural sector; For 
                                                 
6 In this case, interprofessional associations are providing all the functions identified by Schwarz (2000) 
associated with contract regulation : i) enforcing a contract verifiable terms, ii) supplying vocabularies, iii) 
interpreting agreements, iv) supplying default rules and regulating the contracting process.  
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example, can organic producers, involved in several productions, and all be organized in a 
representative interprofessional association supporting this sector? For this reason, some 
heterogeneity remains among sectors which adopt and those which do not.  
1. 3 – From legal enforcement to collective self-regulation  
In part of the literature on private ordering, the development of the formal legal system 
for contract enforcement is presented as another reason to stop using informal reputation-
based mechanisms (Clay, 1997). Another perspective is proposed then with this legal 
framework on interprofessional organization in agriculture (Danet, 1982). For many 
agricultural products, the small value of goods at stake, time sensitive activities observation 
problems when products are highly perishable or that fraud has to be observed in situ, highly 
specialized or technical skills, limit the effectiveness of public court enforcement. 
In the literature, several studies demonstrate that trade associations frequently rely on 
agreement among members to bring all contract disputes to arbitration conducted under 
“laws” and procedures established by the trade association by itself (Bernstein, 1992, Pirrong, 
1995). There are transactions that public courts simply cannot efficiently enforce (substantial 
procedure delays, time for dispute solving, overload,…). Private dispute resolution holds out 
the potential to contracting parties of reducing the cost and increasing the efficacy of 
contractual commitments, by overcoming failures of the institutions that support public 
contract law regime or even public regulation by administrative authorities.  
The major and most elaborate argument supporting this complementarity view is 
based on the idea that (incomplete) formal contracts can facilitate the self-enforcement of 
informal agreements. Self-enforcement models depart from the premise that informal dealings 
are only stable when the long term pay-off conditional on cooperation exceeds gains from 
short term defection (Klein, 1992, Lazzarini et al. 2004, Greif, 2005). The specific dimension 
is here that the focus is equally to ex ante prevention of litigations than their ex post resolution 
which imply most of the time the complete termination of the contractual relationship. The 
operation of the reputation mechanism enable members not to cheat ex post. The creation of 
formal institution means that administrative costs incurred are compensate by the expected 
total collective gains allowed by a reduction of commercial conflicts and dis-trust among 
parties. This especially supposes that all parties have an advantage to the change of trading 
rules and that behaviours converge towards a solution « winner-winner » (Pirrong, 1995)7.  
                                                 
7 In his analysis of private enforcement mechanisms and rules designed by the Chicago Board of Trade, Pirrong 
(1995) shows that the implementation of new rules which could have increase the total activity and quantities 
traded by the board, the legal intervention of the state was still needed to was still to impose them, as some of 
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Analysing their legal foundations and judicial implications, Danet (1982) introduces a 
distinction between these two forms of collective organizations in agriculture relying on 
alternative principle of discipline and self-regulation among members:  
- the one’s based on intra-professionnal discipline or self-regulation, like 
producer’s groups or cooperatives,… where members are only farmers guaranteeing some 
relative homogeneity among stakeholders (see Hendrikse, 2004, for a possible discussion 
of this point); 
- The one’s based on inter-professionnal discipline or self-regulation, like 
interprofessionnal associations where representatives of farmer trade-unions, but also of 
cooperatives, private middlemen, agro-food firms, and even representatives of small and 
large retailers can be involved depending of the objectives of the association.  
Both of these two types of collective organization of producers are based on self-
regulation, but the underlying rationale is different. For the development of producer’s group, 
the expected benefits of this type of collective organization is to enhance the bargaining 
power of individual farmers in bilateral negotiations with large agro-food firms, but as well 
improving possible market power, i.e. the ability to influence market prices, by rounding up 
larger quantities of agricultural products8. On the opposite, promoting the creation of 
interprofessional associations was based on a different philosophy oriented towards the 
promotion of dialogues among economic actors in a same agricultural sector. Our analysis 
will be focusing in a first step primarily on the role of these interprofessionnal organizations. 
 
II- PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS AS A SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL REPUTATION MECHANISMS  
When considering the specific dimensions of contract regulation in agriculture, and 
especially the role of interprofessional organisations in contract regulation, two dimensions 
need then to be taken into account their influence in reducing transaction costs. First, a change 
in the self-enforcing range of contracts improving private enforcement mechanisms. Second, 
the reduction of administration costs for the functioning of formal organization needed to 
implement appropriate information systems and multilateral reputation mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
participants were loosing part of bargaining power  and profits due to an improved delineation of property rights 
and transparency of transactions.   
8 In return, farmers had to accept some restrictions on their commercial freedom: to follow technical rules and 
requirements defined by their producer’s groups, to commit to an  “exclusivity rule”  by delivering all their 
production for a specific product, and finally, to accept delegating price determination to the producer’s group. 
On their own side,  producer’s groups benefit of a partial “ territorial exclusivity ” in prospecting farmers and 
for their own member, which aim to provide to a minimum level of activity allowing the producer’s group to get 
more bargaining power and  reduce destructive competition between competing producer’s group, but still 
maintaining it with private middlemen in a very competitive market, which is the case in the French context.  
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2.1 – Optimizing the self-enforcing range of contracts  
The analytical framework of Klein (1992, 1996) has been first developed in the case of 
bilateral formal contracts. The nature of contract terms is influencing directly the self-
enforcing range of contracts, i.e. the incentives for the contractor to commit to contract terms 
and not to deviate. In this case, the self-enforcing range of the contract is defined by the 
difference between H , the expected gains of cheating or adopting an opportunistic behavior, 
and K the private sanction imposed by the other party if cheating is discovered or contract 
terms not applied. Contracts are self-enforcing only if K > H. 9  In this model, K, is a capital 
cost, i.e. the discounted value of future returns on specific investments that will be lost upon 
termination of the relationship , but as well the increased costs of purchasing inputs or 
supplying services in the market place after the termination of the relationship that can be 
imposed upon the transactors that violates the contractual understanding.  
Schema 1 – contract law and the efficiency of self-enforcing mechanisms  
 
 
                                                 
9The area in the hold-up probability distribution where the expected gains are greater than the private 
enforcement capital. Regarding the respective hold-up gains of agro-food firm (Hr) and those of the suppliers 
(Hs), it will be equivalent to  :  [1 – Fs (Ks)] + [1 –Fr (Kr)]. 
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The global objective for the contracting parties is, once the contract terms are set, to 
minimize the value of the expected “hold-up” probability, or the sum of the areas in the tails 
of the two “hold-up” probability distributions where each transactor’s hold-up potential is 
greater than its private enforcement capital. This self-enforcing range of contractual 
arrangements can be modified by including some specific clauses in formal contracts which 
can be enforced by public courts which either increase sanctions through penalties, or by 
increasing expected future streams of quasi-rents or creating bilateral dependence 
(Williamson, 1996). The formalization of contracts allows then to economize on the level of 
reputation capital Kw1 required to assure the self-enforcing range of contractual arrangements 
in the absence of appropriate contract law 10. Private reputation-based mechanisms can be as 
well activated in the presence of a legal system.  
2.2 - From bilateral to multilateral reputation mechanisms 
The implementation of multilateral reputation-based mechanisms involved more 
complex rules (Greif, 2005). In a similar way, in the case of multilateral reputation 
mechanisms, the amount of sanctions are equal to the sum of individual sanctions, and 
defined by the loss of expected future streams of revenue W1 which could have been obtained 
through the maintaining of commercial relationships applied with all N group members. 
However, punishing a specific trader by not is also a costly process for individuals. Then the 
overall system relies on the effectiveness of incentives to those to apply these sanctions 
(Greif, 1993). This also means that the net collective expected gains of reducing transactions 
costs at a bilateral level are covering the administrative costs linked to the implementation of 
these multilateral-reputation mechanisms. The literature is replete with instances of such 
coordinated and collective punishment.  
One of the main result of these models is first to demonstrate that even in the absence 
of repeated interactions or observability/verifiability problems of individual behaviours, 
reputation mechanisms may still be working and provide appropriate ex ante incentives to 
economic agents not to cheat ex post. In a recent article, Clay (1997) identifies several types 
of possible organisations for the implementation of these repeated multilateral reputation 
based mechanisms:  
- a decentralized one such as informal coalitions of economic agents, like family 
members, where ostracism is easier to implement (Greif 1994, Clay, 1997). The central 
feature of a coalition was the reputation mechanism that linked agents past conduct and their 
                                                 
10 Klein (1996) includes also in his analysis possible strategic behaviour of contractors asking to public courts 
the complete execution of contract term while contract equilibrium between parties has changed.  
  12
future payoffs. In many cases, merchants addressed this issue by using family members as 
agents or ostracism among a small community (Greif, 1994). The typical enforcement 
mechanism is here when, for example, a merchant community punishes parties in breach of 
contracts by denying them future business. 
- a centralized ones based on formal private institutions, like guilds, clubs (Milgrom, 
North, Weingast, 1990). The latter is based on a central authority which identifies cheaters 
and may punish who do not punish cheaters according. This centralized organization allows a 
better coordination of member actions, centralization and diffusion information and as well, 
for some of them applying directly these sanctions.  
When informal coalitions of agents involved in a sufficiently small community, 
ostracism among group members, but as well shared social norms (Kandori, 1992) may be 
enough to ensure effectiveness of multilateral punishment and the implementation of 
economic or social sanctions (Greif, 1993). For larger communities, these mechanisms may 
become rapidly ineffective and may require the creation of formal administrative structures to 
support them (North et al. 1990, Greif et al. 1993, Greif 2005). They especially require de 
design of dedicated information and communication systems among members. However, high 
fixed costs associated with designed private institutions imply that organic ones would be 
more efficient when there is little gain from expanding the number of exchanging individuals 
or when loss due to bilateral repeated interactions is very small (Greif, 2005)11. The 
multilateral setting sees a changing landscape of differently paired relationships in a system 
that organizes a multitude of transactions. 
2.3 – Contract law and the stability of private institutions  
The existence of legal framework supporting such designed private institutions may 
improve its functioning and reduce transaction costs by creating a more favourable climate for 
commercial exchanges.  One central issue for the efficiency of these CEI is their stability over 
time and regarding their membership (Clay, 1997, Greif, 2005). In this case, Richman (2005) 
suggest that private law is only limited to long term players and is associated with sizable 
entry barriers, which may cerate new incentives for collusive behaviour which in return may 
impose some costs and affect negatively the total surplus.  And as a matter of fact, Clay 
(1997) suggests that barriers to entry and exit from coalition were a necessary condition for 
them to work. First, the barriers by ensuring stable membership in the coalition, enabled the 
information network to provide a principal with information on agents past behaviour and to 
                                                 
11 These activities are taking place among self-interested individuals interacting with varying frequency in an 
environment characterized by uncertainty and limited ability to observe one another’s action.  
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mitigate information asymmetries between an agent and a principal. Second, as suggested by 
Kenney, Klein (1983), barriers preserved the differential between what members could earn 
inside and outside the coalition (Clay, 1997). These barriers could be define by ethnic, 
language, … and endogenous reasons of being officially part of the coalition.  
These barriers may in fact become more or less porous enough to allow the gradual 
expansion of the coalition. And as well, instability can lead to the collapse of the coalition, 
especially when members do not have strong enough convergence of interests among them. 
Open networks may enjoy lower entry barriers, but assume corresponding costs of one-time 
cheaters. The larger the number of individuals that can benefit from this public good, and as 
information about the individual value of this good is private, the probability of finding an 
agreements extending the coercive power of these private institutions is lower (Pirrong 1995).  
When members are not homogenous and not pure substitutes, or that they are 
competing to each other, the possibility of common actions are reduced, as free rider 
problems may arise and the incentives to comply to the collective discipline lower. The 
incentives for some agents to adopt a “free-riding” behaviour are large enough to take 
advantage of this service while not contributing financially to its furniture. In order to be 
effective, the functioning of these private ordering institutions need to meet two conditions :  
 Ensure a sufficient degree of « cohesiveness » among members in order to 
implement a collective self-regulation and improve the efficiency of collective sanctions. In 
the literature, the main identified factors is the homogeneity of members in a group, or the 
strength of social links in a professional community (Clay, 1997, Greif et al. 1994).   
 Benefit of a sufficient level of acceptability and legitimacy for a voluntary adhesion 
of its members, as those will have to accept to voluntary comply to possible sanctions and 
may be asked to impose sanctions to others even if it is costly for them.  
In this situation, Pirrong (1995) demonstrate that the support of the state through a 
specific law enforcement was then supporting the legitimacy that can be expected from the 
support of the normative and coercive power of the state, improving then their efficiency 
(Barzel, 2002). They do not substitute the action of public courts which remain the ultimate 
court of appeal in case of litigations among parties12. In another hand, when economic gains 
are shared fairly, this equity principle is enough to guarantee the cooperation of the parties 
(Libecap, 1989, Pirrong, 1995). Its implementation may fail because one category of agents 
are in a worst situation after a change of rules. If not, the creation of these private institutions 
                                                 
12 Arbitration agreements have still to be enforced and public courts must cooperate by refusing to hear the 
dispute that has been solved through arbitration (Hadfield, 2005). Similar issues exist for mediation.  
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relies, either on the normative and coercive power of the state to impose a solution to all the 
parties (Pirrong, 1995), or the granting of compensations or the credible threat of massive 
retaliations, which could be more costly than the acceptance by the concerned parties of a 
partial loss of their bargaining or market power (Williamson, 1968, Greif et al. 1994). 
III – A CASE STUDY : THE ROLE OF INTERPROFESIONAL ASSOCIATION IN AGRICULTURE 
In the literature, the diversity of information and communication mechanisms used for 
the implementation of multilateral-reputation mechanisms is beginning to be well documented 
(Greif, 2005). It is then important to understand the specific features underlying the action of 
these interprofessional associations regarding contract regulation and enforcement. Due to the 
diversity of situations observed among agricultural sectors, we have chosen to focus on a 
specific case study of the cattle industry. 
3.1 – Motivation for the creation of a CEI : a brief historical perspective  
The interesting point with this sector is that the interprofessional organization created 
in 1980 is not subject to usual criticism of collusive behaviour on centralized price 
determination, nor quantity restrictions through production quotas all practices prohibited by 
competition law (See Chalfant and Sexton, 2004, Zago 1999, Ménard, 1998)13. Data used for 
this case study were collected by interviewing the administrators of the national 
interprofession and of the three main and leading Local interprofessional Committes in 
western France (Brittany, Normandie and the Loire Vallée), by analysing legal and historical 
documentations (statutes, meeting minutes, decrees, interprofessional agreements, …). 
The formal and legal creation of the national interprofessional association in the cattle 
industry took place only in 1980 (decree of November 18th, 1980). This creation was 
motivated by regional experiences implemented since the beginning of the 70’s in the three 
main producing areas in France, which are all located in western France : Brittany, Normandy 
and the Loire’s Vallée. These three regions are representing about 40 % of the total French 
production, both in term of breeding farms and total activity of slaughtering houses located in 
these regions. All French regions did not follow immediately this trend, some of them being 
reluctant to such organization. The motivations for the creation of a formal organisation came 
                                                 
13 As a consequence in the 90’s some competition between legal orders emerge creating some new sources of 
possible legal insecurities for the institutional architecture build aside to regulate agricultural markets. Among 
the condemned practices regarding competition law were : centralized price determination by interprofessional 
association , restrictions on production level through production quotas, statistical information systems on 
production and price (Ménard, 1998, Raynaud, Valceschini, 2005). This situation is also questioning the 
doctrinal coherence and categorizations within competition law, and especially the separation in one hand, laws 
on cartel regulation and on the other side, consolidation regulations, the former applying to collective 
organization of small farmers, the latter to the consolidation process of large agro-food firms or retailing sectors. 
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from the difficulties met by the region Loire’s Vallée in implementing interprofessional 
agreements among all parties without any formal organization. Compared to the two other 
regions, Brittany and Normandie, which created first an administrative organization under a 
legal statute of an union in Normandy in 1970 (called CIRVIANDE) and a non-profit-making 
association in Brittany in 1977 (called INTERBOVI), professional representative 
organizations in the region of Loire’s Vallée have chosen first to develop interprofessional 
agreements on contract regulation and enforcement without in a first step having any 
administrative support. The first interprofessional agreement was in fact signed in this region 
in 1976 (see table) without any formal organization to enforce it. The Local Interprofessional 
Committee (LIC), Boviloire, will only be created after the creation and acknowledgement y-
the-law of the national interprofessional association in 1980. The choice to adopt this legal 
solution was motivated for the economic operators of this region by three major limitations 
met during this 4 years period of experiments:  
 from a legal perspective, the formal agreement of all interested in the sector 
regarding the authority and functions of the interprofessional  association would have required 
the signature of more than 300 bilateral contracts with all slaughtering firms, individual 
merchants or cooperatives involving extra negotiation and administration costs, without being 
sure that all of them will accept and comply effectively these new rules, even if it is 
improving total welfare This legal solution appears not workable.  
 the (relatively small) initial administrative costs were covered by some funding 
given by the representative professional organisations and farmer’s unions of the region, those 
having themselves limited amount of financial resources. Moreover, free riding by some small 
operators emerge rapidly even if collective contract enforcement is public good benefiting to 
all. This financial constraint is a major issue both locally and at the national level. After its 
formal creation in 1980, the national interprofession began its activity only in 1984, when tax 
collection was effectively implemented allowing to hire employees and to cover other 
administrative costs. 
 The development of inter-regional trade between Brittany and the Loire’s Vallée 
was creating distortions among slaughtering firms, one regions applying more strict rules than 
the other leading some individual farmers to refuse to sell their animals if they knew that they 
will be slaughtered in the other region, and as well between slaughtering firms. A national 
harmonization appears then as a better solution.  
The official functions of interprofessional associations are in general related to : i) the 
definition and enforcement of interprofessional agreements; it may also include depending of 
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the sectors, mediations and prevention of dispute litigations;; ii) collective R & D funding, 
including applied researches on quality problems, improvement of production systems,…, and 
iii) developing collective consumer information and communication campaign.  
In the case of the cattle industry, this last function took a specific importance during 
the BSE crisis in 1996, when its advertising and communication subsidiary became actively 
involved in the crisis management and in collecting scientific information to communicate it 
to the general public. Nevertheless, the role of the interprofessional association in contract 
regulation remains, from our perspective, a central issue as it is promoting more transparency 
in the organization of transactions and the sharing of quasi-rents. The first formal 
interprofessional agreement in the cattle sector was signed in 1988 and was related to the 
marketing conditions of cattle over 6th months of age, rules of access to life market places in 
order to provide added security of payments, and more recently after the BSE crisis on 
dedicated labelling rules of beef meat in order to improve consumer’s information on the 
origin, breed and types of the animals. They provides then more precise rule regarding 
property rights allocation and transfer, even if most contracts are informal in this sector14.  
 
Encadré 2: Content of the Interprofessional agreement on the marketing of cattle above 6 months of age.  
a- Rules regarding property rights transfer : delays between sale agreement and animals removal at the farm, 
lenght of the waiting period for animals after removal of the farm and before slaughter, rules for carcass 
presentation and weighting after slaughter. 
b- Transfer of risks : this includes establishing responsabilities in case of mortal accident of the animal during 
transportation or transfer to the slaughter house, and as well for sanitary seizures by vetrerinary public 
authorities. Local Interprofessional Committee are providing a mdediation service using veterinary experts in a 
short delay as product are very perishable.   
c- Indidvidual Animal  identification : standards for traceability systems into slaughter house which are central 
for sanitary purposes, but as well for the payment to the farmers (who have to be paid for their onwn animal, and 
not for the one of another farmer (mistakes that are sometimes very common).  
d- Payment delays to the farmers :no more than three weeks  
e – Standardization of Information provided on weight tickets delivered to the seller: these informations 
allow the farmer to verify if all is correct and is corresponding to their own animals, and if necessary to make a 
claim if something seems to be wrong in a appropriate short delays in order to ask the interprofession to verify 
the situation. Some interprofession requires the slaughter house to keep in place carcasses at minima 24h in order 
to operate such verification before the sending of carcasses to customers. Communication of these weight tickets 
to farmers in a short delays is another issue regarding verification. 
f- les conditions de pesée des animaux à l’abattoir. L’accord définit les normes de réfaction à appliquer en 
fonction de la présentation des carcasses, ainsi que les délais à respecter entre l’abattage et la pesée. 
 
                                                 
14 Due to dramatic changes in R&D funding in agriculture since 2002, most of agricultural sectors are nowadays 
adopting interprofessionnal organizations, but most of the new one are not necessarily involved in contract 
enforcement. One of the R&D project funded by the interprofession in the beef industry is the design and 
building of an automatic grading systems for beef carcasses, with the expected result of a more objective 
measurement than the one realized by specialized employees of slaughtering firms.  
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3.2 – The main source of contract litigation and its resolution 
Incomplete specifications of what is exchanged and problems of transfer of property 
rights among contracting parties is identified as another major sources of litigations (Pirrong, 
1995). Agents have therefore to make individual efforts to delimit and make their (exclusive) 
rights of use of enforceable and to transfer them (Barzel, 1989).One specific issue in the case 
of agricultural products is that contracts, even when they are informal, involve complex issues 
of quality that are either difficult to measure or verify, particularly when the timeliness of 
compliance is critical. For these dimensions, verifiability by courts is often limited by their 
technical dimensions, and as well the short delays required in food process for safety reasons. 
The creation of these interprofessional associations took place in fact in a process 
transformation in the organization of transaction between slaughtering firms and their 
suppliers in a sector where most contracts remains informal. The major change is related to 
the adoption of new pricing rules and the move from negotiated prices in bilateral transactions 
taking place in life traditional markets places to posted prices set directly by slaughtering 
firms actually used for more than two/third of transactions (Mazé, 2000). The economic 
expected trade-off for this change was a reduction of search costs of animals in small and 
geographically scattered farms, and as well of bargaining costs and measurements costs for 
highly variable quality attributes of animals. Nevertheless, this new pricing rule involves that 
quality measurement, which is central for price determination, is realized ex post when 
animals are already at the slaughter house, allowing possible opportunistic behaviours of 
slaughtering firms.  
This dimension is one of the major documented sources of litigations and distrust 
between farmers and agro-food firms (Feusti, Feuz, 1993, Hobbs, 1997). Quality 
measurement problem are a major source of quasi-rent appropriation (Barzel, 1982). Hence, 
even if standardized carcass grading15, rather than animal life sales, present the advantages of 
reducing measurement’s errors in value and price determination, this price rule way also 
facilitate possible ex post opportunistic behaviour and down-grading of animal by 
slaughtering firms. Measurement error’s on grading can lead to a loss of final value of 15-
20% for an animal paid to the breeder. Even if such errors are not necessarily statically 
                                                 
15 A decree by-law of 1977 (modified) is defining dressing and weighing rules of cattle carcasses (used to define 
the European regulation du 12/08/81. Nevertheless, the existence of this standard (mainly motivated by the 
implementation of european statistical system for market regulation) does not mean its effective use in contracts 
by economic agents, even if carcass grading is realized by slaughterhouses. From a strict legal point of view, the 
slaughter house is legally the only one responsible for the realization of carcass grading and cannot be realized 
by other firms or institutions. Slaughter houses are private property where access can be restricted.  
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significant on a large number of animals (error’s can go either low or high), they are still 
affecting the perception of fairness and the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by the other 
party. Apart the problem of direct observability of possible frauds by farmers, reputation 
mechanisms and the activation of bilateral sanctions by individual farmers has no chance to 
deter such abuses and to discourage slaughtering firms to engage in such behaviors. 
An official control is performed by a quasi-public administration (the french Meat and 
Lifestock Commission, OFIVAL) to the benefit of a formal delegation of this prerogative by 
the state. Moreover, a second level of controls is exceptionally performed by the 
administration (répression des fraudes). Nevertheless, many breeders were considering these 
controls as insufficient and some Local Interprofessional Committee, especially in the three 
pioneering regions get rapidly involved in the provision of inspection services. These 
inspection services aim to control the implementation of these interprofessional agreements 
and to provide a professional expertise by trained professionals on grading and quality 
measurement of animals, a main source of possible frauds.  
This inspection service by Local Inteprofessional Committees is taking, for example in 
Brittany, the form of an unexpected visit in each slaughter house once a week, with a review 
process with the manager of the slaughter line of carcasses recently graded and to realise a 
counter evaluation. If differences are identified, a correction can be asked by the expert and 
has to be applied by the slaughterhouse for the payment to the farmer. Such action could be 
more difficult to realize for individual farmers who do not necessarily have the appropriate 
skills and professional legitimacy in carcass grading. Nevertheless, this type of inspection 
service is not provided in all regions, this activity being then realized by a quasi-public 
agency (OFIVAL). Problems arising for the transfer of property rights are a major motivation 
for requesting the arbitrage of this private institution, which is providing an independent 
expertise in case of litigations or uncertainty regarding the respective liability of the parties in 
the problem. (table below). 
Table : Requested mediations to the Local Interprofessional Committee in Brittany. 
Motif de 
l'intervention 
 
Litigations
on carcass 
weights  
Litigations on 
carcass grading  
Liability sharing in case 
of animal mortality or 
sanitary seizures 
Litigations on animal 
identification or loss of 
official weight tickets  
256 interventions 
Part (en %) 
31% 15% 33% 16% 
Source : Original data computed from phone records of  CIR Bretagne over a period of 18 months in 1994-95 
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Even if the total number of requested mediations (here 256 over a period of 18 
months) is relatively low compared to the total number of transactions in this region (over 4 
millions animals are annually slaughtered), the existence of such service is contributing to 
improve mutual trust among parties, and then play a dissuasive role. The action of this 
interprofessional organization is then more preventive than strictly coercive. These features 
minimized the number of potential disputes and economized on transaction costs.  
3.3 – The threat of collective boycott as an economic sanction  
Another dimension of the role of interprofessional association as a private contract 
enforcement institution is the activation of multilateral reputation mechanisms to punish 
repeated and established opportunistic behaviours. The activation of multilateral reputation 
mechanisms is relying on dedicated information and communication systems implemented by 
the formal private institution (Greif, 2005). These mechanisms in the case of cattle industry 
are taking two forms: i) a procedural and formal one coordinated directly by the 
interprofession itself, ii) an informal one taking the form of extra-legal boycott actions. As 
noticed by Clay (1997), one striking thing about this type of private institutions is the 
infrequent use of collective punishment and private ordering. In this case, details matter to 
identify the modus operandi of the activation of these multilateral reputation mechanisms. 
Crisis situations  are thus revealing the needs for adjustments and changes in equilibrium.  
The procedural and formal way that can be implemented by the interprofessional 
association is the following form. If repeated non compliances to interprofessional agreements 
are observed, the Local Interprofessional Committee can introduce a formal procedure of 
information, leading if it is proceed completely, to the publication in specialized professional 
newspapers of appropriate information. This publication can then alter the reputation of ….. 
In between, a first step is the writing of formal report on deviant behaviours to the board of 
directors of the interprofessional association. In case of another repeated offences, a written 
injunction is sent to the offender. Without any appropriate change in behaviour or commercial 
practices, an official information letter is sent to the chairman of the professional union to 
which the offender belongs to, this one being free to engage disciplinary sanctions possibly 
leading to a banning. Such sanctions remains exceptional and the above complete procedure 
for sanctioning opportunistic behaviours have still never been applied.  
In this procedure, the banning is nevertheless here of more limited impact than the one 
generally described in the literature on private ordering (Milgrom et al, 1990) due to the fact 
that the offender may still be able to continue its commercial activity. Nevertheless, one may 
expect that slaughtering firms had no incentives to accept the intrusion into their business of a 
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private contract enforcement institution16. Such contract enforcement institutions impose 
restrictions on the use of their bargaining power to extract larger part of quasi-rents generated 
by this activity from farmers. The question is then why they accept to comply even partially 
with the authority of such private institution?  
The creation of interprofessional organisation participate to the pacification and the 
institutionalisation of contractual regulations and dialogues among parties which present the 
advantage to reduce other forms of collective actions, especially violent actions, i.e the ability 
to impose a costs even by illegal means (Barzel, 2002). Nevertheless it does not exclude any 
possibility of such event, even more their implementation is often the result of the anticipation 
of more costly enforcement mechanisms, especially the threat of massive sanctions like 
boycotts or economic blockade (North et al. 1990). In one of his historical study, Greif (1993) 
give an illustration the way such private ordering institutions were coordinating collective 
boycotts or economic blockade of cities. In this type of situation, it becomes less costly for the 
other parties to accept a third party neutral verification. The implementation of these sanctions 
requires specific mechanisms that allow the cohesion of the group and the effective 
implementation of these sanctions by all group members, even if these sanctions are costly for 
individual members due to the temporary loss of incomes (Greif, 1993, Clay, 1997).  
Regarding their implementation in agricultural sectors, political farmer’s unions rather 
than interprofessional association which need to remain neutral in the conflict are taking the 
active role in the coordination of the collective boycott action (Duclos, 1998). Boycotts and 
temporary economic blockade of agro-food firms or general infrastructures have been 
common in agricultural sectors as a mode of political influence despite their decrease since 
the 60’s17. The advantage of this strategy is to involve a limited number of persons (and 
trucks, tractors,…) but organized in a commando-type of organization. Defections and free-
riding behavior in larger groups of participants and group member may compromise its 
effectiveness. This type of collective sanction needs nevertheless to remain exceptional, even 
if their episodic activation, even sometimes without any specific reason, has been reported in 
order to maintain a credible threat to deter possible abuse of power or opportunistic behaviour 
(Greif et al. 1994). Procedural conflict resolution is preferred in the case of interprofessions.  
                                                 
16 In 1994, a complete physical blockade of the entrance of  main slaughtering firms located in the region of the 
Loire vallée was implemented by coordinated groups of farmers. This blockade stopped after the accidental 
death of an employee of one of this slaughtering firms, three weeks after its start. 
17 In the case of cattle breeders, raising a blockade is easier compared to other more perishable agricultural 
products as they can keep their life animal at the farm for a longer period of time with a marginal loss in term of 
animal’s quality downgrading and added costs of animal feeding during this period (like f.e one month).  
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IV – A PREDICTIVE MODEL FOR OTHER AGRICULTURAL SECTORS.  
The use of this legal framework on interprofessional organization in agriculture cannot 
be imposed to a specific agricultural sector. It remains under the sole initiative of private 
economic actors of each individual sector. The observation of its adoption or not stands then 
like a natural experiment and clue us on constraints and benefits expected from the effective 
implementation of this legal framework.  
4.2-  The gains of cooperation through interprofessional action 
The creation of private contract-enforcement institutions is one option among others 
alternatives. When effective public-order institution exists, economic agent can respond to 
their limitations for fostering contract enforcement by appropriately structuring their 
contractual relationships, property rights distribution and organizational forms (Greif, 2005). 
In a first step, bilateral arrangements among contractors may be enough to narrow possible 
sources of contractual hazards through hostage-taking, vertical integration and corporate 
governance (Williamson, 1985, Klein, 1992). Such option has been investigated with the 
initial development of producer’s groups and their involvement in modernization and above 
all privatisation of slaughtering houses. This privatisation was motivated by large investments 
and financial capital required to meet European sanitary standards18. Half slaughtering firms 
in the beef sector are still cooperatives. Nevertheless, the involvement of producer’s groups 
creates ambiguities in their ability to achieve what for they have been created. 
The creation of a dedicated legal statute for producer’s groups was first motivated by 
the will to reinforce collective bargaining power of farmers by gathering together their 
production and implementing collective self-regulation will become at an equal position to 
agro-food firms (Danet, 1982). Nevertheless, their action reveals itself partly inadequate 
regarding repeated verifiability problems on quality measurement and price determination. In 
a competitive context with other private slaughtering firms, cooperatives subject to equity 
rules with their members suffered competitive distortions in their disfavour due to these 
differences in the implementation of grading systems19.  
                                                 
18 In 2000, 25% of slaughter activity for cattle is still performed by public slaughter houses directly managed by 
local public administration (régie) or through a delegation to a semi-public firms or through concession 
contracts. After a reduction of 35% in number during the last ten years, there are 291 slaughter houses in France.  
19 In France cattle marketing is mainly organized through market intermediaries: producer’s group (32%), private 
middlemen (34%), traditional market places (19%) and direct relationship with slaughtering firms (10-15%) Less 
than 2-3% of transactions are taking place in auction markets. Nevertheless, producer’s group play a central role 
in the privatization of slaughtering houses, by supporting the involvement of cooperatives in the slaughter and 
meat packing activities, these one representing today  half total quantities. Nevertheless, the consolidation 
process of slaughtering firms has been slower than in other sectors. . 
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The combination of these two factors explains the limitations of producer’s groups in 
offering the same level of guarantees regarding their independence towards agro-food firms. 
In such context, the creation of an interprofessional association was providing a solution to 
these enforcement problems, and as a way to facilitate the adoption by farmers of new pricing 
rules (Hobbs, 1997). One of the major changes in contract used in this sector is the move from 
bilateral negotiation taking places in traditional market places to posted price by slaughtering 
firms to a set of selected suppliers (Mazé, 2003). Nevertheless, the gains obtained by a 
reduction of information and bargaining costs can be ruled out by ex post measurement and 
enforcement costs (Barzel, 1982, Wang, 1993). The ability to supply effective designed-
private or public-order contract enforcement institutions is thus central (Greif, 2005).  
The ability to supply effective designed-private or public-order contract enforcement 
institutions is thus central (Greif, 2005). In a sequential Prisoner Dilemma game with 
imperfect monitoring, where contractors choose first the pricing rules, and the buyers decide 
in a second step to cheat or not to cheat, equilibrium stage without appropriate institutional 
setting is always cheat. The trade-off is then the following: Gains adopting a new pricing rules  > Costs 
collective retaliation  > Costs third party monitoring20. 
Under certain condition, the fear of risking a costly retaliation by the commercial 
sector would induce those with the coercive power to prefer consulting it rather than taking 
unilateral actions effecting property rights (Greif, 2005). In this perspective, the creation of an 
interprofessional association is providing an alternative to other violent coercive means. A 
formal organisation is helping to reduce coordination costs, but its action is in some occasion 
limited by the fact that it needs to remain neutral regarding conflicting interests, but not 
necessarily independent as it requires a fine understanding of political issues related to the 
performance of economic activities in a dedicated sector. 
4.2- The changing nature of coalitions: limitations to interprofessional action 
Other intrinsic rules governing the organisation of interprofessional association are at 
stake when considering their effectiveness. Lorvellec (1993) identified three foundation 
principles which are: representativeness, parity, and unanimity. This especially means that, 
following a democratic logic, a specific decision cannot be taken without the agreement of all 
participating professional representative organizations. Actions taken by interprofessional 
                                                 
20 The total budget of the french national interprofessional association was, in 1995 before implementing an 
automation of carcass grading, around 10, 5 millions of Euros, with 35% of this budget coming back to the Local 
Interprofessional Committee (LIC) for their own functioning. In 1995, the tax was based on a per-unit of carcass 
weight amount, and move only in 2000 to a lump sum amount for each slaughtered animal.  
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associations have to be oriented towards the common interest of all the economic parties 
involved. Hence, the effectiveness of this type of private institution relies less on coercion 
than voluntary commitment and shared consensus among parties which may have at first sight 
opposite economic interests. In most studies on private ordering, the homogeneity or 
cohesiveness of a group is evaluated by one main criterion, the membership to an ethnic 
community or to a professional group (Greif, 1993, 2005).  
The national interprofessional association dedicated to the cattle industry involves 11 
representatives professional organizations, including large and small retailers representatives, 
farmers’s unions, cooperatives, cattle middlemen, private slaughtering firms, public slaughter 
houses,…. When considering the total number of parties involved, the expected benefits of 
the use of the legal framework supporting interprofessional organization (1975’s Law) is first 
to establish its legitimacy and its acceptance by all parties, and as well its stability over time 
while facing members with divergent interests. This is a major constraint as the law of 1975 
on interprofessional organization in agriculture requires that only one national interprofession 
can receive a formal agreement for each agricultural sector.  
In fact, the structure of coalitions in such complex setting is not stable and may vary in 
many other dimensions when agents are not homogeneous in their objectives and strategies 
even in a same professional group. Such situations where coalition’s members are not 
homogeneous have been emphasised in the case of agricultural cooperatives by Hendrikse, 
Bijman (2000) by distinguishing adverse selection effects among farmers. The question is 
either not only on influence ability and between minority and majority voting rules as it is 
assessed in the literature (Zago, 1999). In the case of interprofessional organization, coalitions 
may change depending of the combination of two dimensions and the nature of temporary 
strategic alliances among professional family and also across regions where specialisation and 
concentration of production systems creates also interdependencies between local farmers and 
agro-food firms located in the same region.  
With the modernization and privatization of slaughtering firms, large infrastructure 
investments have been realized, increasing in return the interdependence between local 
farmers and agro-food firms which have developed specific assets requiring an optimization 
of the supply process. As suggested by transaction costs economics, the development of 
specific assets is a major source of bilateral dependence (Williamson, 1985). The quality of 
contractual relationships, i.e. the reduction of explicit conflicts, may also enhance economic 
competitiveness of a specific region. Thus, this regional link can be very strong and supersede 
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professional identity as a major driver in the formation of coalitions21. The equilibrium 
between intra and interregional competitions is here central. This equilibrium may influence 
directly the effectiveness of interprofessional action as it involves the delegation to a national 
level rather than keeping decision making and collected taxes at the local level.  
One good example of such conflicts between national and locals level is illustrated in 
the cattle industry by the negotiations which took place with some region (here Brittany) to 
define the financial channels for collecting interprofessional taxes with two options : the 
money being sent directly to the national which is the usual norm, or this money passing first 
in the local interprofessional committee before sending appropriate portion to the national 
level, solution adopted in the case of Britanny contrasting thus with the situation of other 
regions. The second option is in a way an impairment to general principles defined by the law 
of 1975 on interprofessional organization in agriculture.  
As a matter of fact, the choice of one of these solutions is changing the balance of 
powers between the national and the local level and the ability to use it as a financial leverage. 
This is especially the case when some regions have a significant leadership either in term of 
political or economic power. This economic power is taking here the shape of market shares 
and production levels. In this case, Greif et al. (1994) were suggesting that it is more valuable 
for a ruler to commit to the rights of groups that are well organized and having a large 
influence, than those of groups less organized and less efficient to apply sanctions in case of 
opportunistic behaviours.  
4.3 – Complementarities between intra and interprofessional self-regulations? 
The interesting point regarding this agricultural cattle sector is twice. First, it departs 
from with the situation of other agricultural sectors which choose not to use the law of 1975 to 
support their own activity (especially for quality inteprofessional association supporting PDO 
wines -Protected Denomination Origin- considering too restrictive internal decision rules 
imposed by the law). Second, in other sector, this structure has been formally recognized, but 
has long no real activity (especially, for example, the pork industry which is using since 1975 
in the main production area since a professional association (with only farmers in the board) 
to directly monitor the implementation of grading systems in slaughter houses). Thus, despite 
                                                 
21 In private commercial arbitration systems, the delegation is realized to an independent third party for solving 
ex post dispute litigations (Hadfield, 1995). In the case of interprofessional, impartiality or neutrality is more 
important in ex ante prevention and mediation  as its legitimacy and acceptance by all parties to voluntary submit 
themselves to its authority is central. Moreover, as noticed by Greif (2005), representative bodies are populated 
of those who balance each other’s coercive and economic powers.  
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some evident advantages, the use of such legal framework on interprofessional organisation is 
not necessarily solving all contract enforcement problems. 
In modern economies, the effectiveness of these private institutions in achieving 
contract enforcement also depend of the legitimacy and the normative and coercive powers 
bestowed by the law (Pirrong, 1995, Barzel, 2002). Complementarities between public and 
private ordering mechanisms emerge here due to a reduction of the amount of reputation 
capital required by the contractor to implement these private mechanisms. In this case, this is 
more valuable for agro-food firms to accept a formal collective organisation of farmers and a 
formal negotiation with them rather than to experience retaliations and non-cooperative 
behaviour of their suppliers. But considering the role of law in contract regulation, Danet 
(1982) is addressing another question related to the connection between interprofessional self-
regulation and pure professional self-regulation implemented by producer’s groups. In the 
literature, there are in general considered separately (Gow et al. 2000, Hendrikse, Bijman, 
2000). From his perspective, the formal separation in the law between these two modes of 
governance was not necessarily serving the global project of more efficient contract 
regulation in agriculture, i.e. achieving a better equity in negotiation between small farmers 
and large agro-food firms, and as a consequence “to be heading for a better parity of farmer’s 
revenue with other social categories” (p. 311-312).  
The objective assigned to contract regulation is here to accompany the modernization 
process and competitiveness of agriculture and agro-food industries. The monopsonistic 
structure of most agricultural sectors is nowadays well documented in many countries with a 
situation facing highly concentrated agri-food sectors. Nevertheless, differences across 
agricultural sectors remain both regarding the dynamic of vertical and horizontal 
consolidation concentration process and the localization and degree of specialisation of 
agricultural productions and processing industries. When considering the nature of 
connexions between professional and interprofessional self-regulation and their consequence 
on contract regulation, several situations can be identified :  
• When firms are numerous and market structure is not concentrated, the 
implementation of an interprofessional organization may be valuable for two main reasons: 
First, it is reducing information search and negotiation costs by implementation a collective 
negotiation between a large number of economic agents. Second, it is regulating the free 
access of many agro-food firms it is regulation and reducing unfair contractual arrangements 
with farmers as well for agro-food firms as it is regulating unfair competition among firms.  
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• When agro-food firms are fewer, the expected benefits of a collective negotiation are 
reduced. Thus, an interprofessional organization is less likely to emerge as it is less costly for 
a firm to manage directly with local producer’s groups. This situation happen, for example, in 
the industry of processed vegetable which was the first agricultural sector to adopt an 
interprofessional organisation in the 60’s, and after a drastic concentration process of firms 
redefine in the 90’s the role of the interprofession with lower prerogatives in contract 
regulation. Professional self-regulation and decentralized collective negotiation remains as it 
is still allowing a reduction of bilateral negotiation costs.  
• A third situation can appear where a strong regional concentration (more than 50% 
of national production concentrated in one region) allows this region to be in a dominant 
position on the market and to impose its own standards for regulating transactions to other 
regions. Such situation was observed in the pork industry, where a professional association is 
supervising grading systems, organizational setting imposed in the years 1974-75 to 
slaughtering firms through actions resorting to violence and blockades of economic activities.  
Both consolidation of agro-food firms and geographical concentration of agricultural 
productions have created some regional specialization. In this case, this is not only the agro-
food firms which are competing towards each over, but rather inter-regional competition. In 
this case, the coalition structure brings together agro-food firms and the farmers belonging to 
the same region. Competition arises also between agricultural regions comparative advantage 
and the development of specific assets. Nevertheless, some conditions attached to the use of 
the legal framework on the interprofessional organization in agriculture have also bound its 
spreading, especially among those supporting collective quality strategies based on PDO 
system (Protected Denomination of Origin) which are functioning more like clubs where 
membership is subject to restriction and selection.  
In the literature on private ordering, these barriers to entry have been identified as a 
major condition to sustain coalition stability and effectiveness regarding contract enforcement 
(Bernstein 1992, Clay, 1997, Richman 2005). While strong enough to maintain stability, the 
barriers need also to be porous enough to allow the gradual expansion of the coalition over 
time which is a condition to capture the gains that arose from a better matching of agents to 
tasks or market opportunities (Clay, 1997). These barriers to entry may nevertheless at some 
point crystallize and membership in it is defined imposing entry restrictions which can affect 
negatively total welfare. When analysing the underlying principles to interprofessional 
organization as defined by the law of 1975, the opposite situation is expected as once created, 
all economic actors of one specific sector have to comply with its rules.  
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CONCLUSION 
Private institutions play a central role in the efficient organization of economic 
exchange and the functioning of market by improving contractual performances and reducing 
transaction costs through the definition of quality classification and codifications. In standard 
contract economics, models rely in general on an implicit hypothesis that information is fully 
verifiable by an independent third party and court enforcement perfect, i.e. without any costs 
or delays for contracting parties. We attempt in this article to fix the gap with another trend in 
literature focusing on private enforcement mechanisms without law. Several recent studies 
tend to illustrate the importance of the legal background institutions necessary to support 
private contracting mechanisms and their potential benefits. First, private enforcement 
institutions may enjoy industry expertise and specialized knowledge regarding industry 
transactions. Second, private law can be tailored to idiosyncratic needs. Third, private systems 
are able to act at lower costs than overload and procedure laden public courts. It leads as well 
to more predictable legal outcomes. Our analytical perspective is based on a positive rather 
than normative approach to law and economics. 
We demonstrate first that the creation of these private institutions act as a way to 
reduce bilateral private enforcement capital of contractors, especially when considering the 
adoption of new pricing rules by firms and the move from negotiated prices to posted price by 
buyers. Second, the legal recognition allows a reduction of governance costs of this 
interprofesionnal organization. However, this is not necessarily a sufficient condition to 
ensure the complete convergence of conflicting interests of its members, and extra-legal 
action may subsist as a credible threat of retaliation. This situation could explain why other 
sectors do not choose to adopt such legal framework. Third, we propose an extension of 
previous bilateral models to the analysis of multilateral mechanisms of sanctions against 
violators by an organised coalition of producers, as well as the role of the legal framework to 
reinforce the stability and the legitimacy of these coalitions, and then their efficiency. We 
derive general propositions regarding under which conditions it is working and when other 
institutional arrangements can be more efficient in preventing contractual sources of 
litigations and in ensuring effective contract enforcement. 
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